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II - Abstract 
A ‘collusion puzzle’ exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the 
ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with 
three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. 
We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential towards an authority, 
firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and 
providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. 
We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects. 
  
III - Text 
1. Introduction 
There are many plausible and well documented reasons why an increasing number of firms 
could make it more difficult to tacitly collude (Huck et al., 2004). However, it is still unclear 
why the experimental literature finds that collusion breaks down with three or more firms in 
the market, while in the real world larger numbers of firms seem to be able to tacitly collude 
(Davies et al., 2011; Sen 2003). Although many dimensions affect the likelihood of a 
collusive market outcome (for a review see Potters and Suetens, 2013), a ‘collusion puzzle’ 
remains regarding what dimensions potentially facilitate the ability to collude in settings with 
larger numbers of firms.1 In this paper we present an experiment showing that, if managers 
are deferential towards an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating 
1 A huge experimental literature on collusive behavior found that fixed player matching 
(Huck et al., 2004b), pre-play communication and announcements (Cason and Davis, 1995; 
Holt and Davis, 1990; Holt, 1985; Huck et al., 2001), within-play communication (Fonseca 
and Normann, 2012; Sally, 1995), leadership in the sense of letting one firm decide first 
(Güth et al., 2007), the opportunity to punish non-collusive behavior (Fehr and Gächter 
2000), experience in market interaction (Benson and Faminow 1988; Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy 2000) and concrete knowledge about the form of cost and demand function (Huck et 
al., 1999) increased the likelihood of observing collusive behavior in oligopolistic settings. In 
contrast to collusion-increasing factors, complementary studies also suggested that e.g. full 
information on individual actions (Huck et al. 1999; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2000) or 
cost asymmetries (Mason et al., 1992, 1991) decreased collusive behavior and increased 
competition instead. 
                                                 
production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges.2 This holds 
not only with two but also with four firms. 
Market size and the ability to collude 
 Experiments since Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Dolbear et al. (1968) have shown a 
significant decrease in the equilibrium price in moving from 2 to 3 or 4 firms in the market. 
In a price setting environment, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) showed that with 3 or 4 firms 
collusion broke down after some initial learning took place. Dolbear et al. (1968) provided 
two main reasons for the breakdown in collusion: first, the profit opportunities from collusion 
decrease in the number of firms in the market as any surplus needs to be split over more firms 
and second, it is harder to bargain and achieve a tacit agreement. Selten (1973) used a model 
to show that collusion becomes harder as the number of firms increases, as the number of free 
riders increases with the number of firms. There are additional reasons why we may expect 
collusion to become more difficult. The ability to use price or quantity to signal the intention 
to collude decreases as the number of firms increases. Furthermore, in the lack of special 
punishment technologies, targeted punishment of deviators becomes impossible. Even if it 
were public knowledge who deviated from an implicit or explicit collusive agreement, it 
would be impossible to punish the deviator only. This is because extending production or 
lowering the price would hurt all market subjects (and not only the deviator). As firms need 
not fear the potential punishment of the other firms, this works against collusion in markets 
with many firms (see e.g. Green et al., 2013; Ivaldi et al., 2003). 
2 By the term nudge we refer to a non-binding cue. This fits with the more general use of the 
term as a change in the decision environment pointing but not forcing a behavior change as 
employed in Sunstein and Thaler's (2008) influential work. 
                                                 
In the experimental design closest to our study, Huck et al. (2004b) found that, whereas firms 
in two player Cournot markets could collude considerably well, this ability decreased almost 
linearly with the number of firms, making firms set quantities even above the Nash prediction 
in markets with 4 or more players. In a Bertrand setting, Fonseca and Normann (2012) 
replicated the general finding that an increasing number of firms decreases the ability to 
collude but also showed that communication between firms could facilitate collusion (which 
is then not tacit anymore) with 4 or more firms.  
Deference to authority and institutional delegation 
This paper considers a different and possibly complementary mechanism that may also 
support collusion even in multiple firms markets. In the key experimental treatments, we use 
the experimenter as the authority providing nudges towards the subjects making decisions 
over quantities. This is meant to model middle managers being delegated to make market 
decisions but who can, nevertheless, get nudged by their line managers in suitable pro-
collusive ways. We believe this to be a considerably ecologically more valid experimental 
model of the role of the authority in the laboratory than, say, providing the role of authority to 
an experimental subject (e.g. as a ring leader); the latter would make the experiment one 
about peer pressure rather than about authority.3 An additional benefit of having the 
3 Ours is a deliberate use of experimenter demand as the direct object of investigation rather 
than a confound relative to other experimental objectives: see Zizzo (2010) for a 
methodological discussion of experimenter demand effects and Cadsby et al. (2006), 
Karakostas and Zizzo (2012) and Silverman et al. (2012) for other applications of using the 
experimenter as authority in the context of a tax compliance, a money burning and a public 
good contribution experiment, respectively. We discuss Silverman et al. (2012) more below. 
                                                 
experimenter as the authority is that we can ensure that there is an identical nudge across 
subjects and sessions (see Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2013). 
Two ingredients are required for the nudge to help collusion. First, we rely on the behavioral 
notion that workers may wish to be deferential towards their line managers, in parallel to 
experimental subjects wishing to be deferential towards the experimenter. In the words of 
organizational psychologists Cialdini and Goldstein (2004, p.596), “most organizations 
would cease to operate efficiently if deference to authority were not one of the prevailing 
norms.”4 Second, we rely on the decision over the market variable (quantity, in our 
experiment) to be one that is delegated to the middle manager.  As noted by Vickers (1985, p. 
144), delegating a decision could “in some cases [be] essential for the credibility of some 
threats, promises and commitments”. While one can make examples where upper 
management was directly involved in setting the market variables in natural world cartels, 
these examples reflect the selected sample of cartels that have been discovered. We suspect 
that it may be rather harder to detect cases where there is no smoking gun at the level of top 
management5 and, more fundamentally, where collusion takes place without any explicit 
communication.6  
4 In a recent economic experiment, Robin et al. (2012) found that workers are willing to 
change their opinions in order to comply with those of their managers. There is empirical 
evidence that subordinates in organizations may not worry about the ethical implications of 
their actions if cued by the authority (Ashford and Vikas, 2003; Darley, 2001), e.g. becoming 
willing to engage in race discrimination (Brief et al., 1995). 
5 For example consider the switchgear cartel where quite sophisticated tactics were deployed 
to keep it a secret. Besides using anonymous email accounts for sending encrypted messages 
lower than top level managers played an important role in this chain of communication. It is 
                                                 
The combination of deference to authority and delegation could work as a commitment 
device which could facilitate collusion. It could also work as a coordination device in the 
presence of common knowledge of the same message being delivered to middle managers of 
different firms. We control for such coordination effect in two ways. First, we implement 
both treatments where such assurance of common knowledge is given and treatments where 
the nudge is private information only. Second, we implement both a private information 
treatment where the nudge requires knowledge of the collusive outcome and one where 
middle managers are simply told to produce less than the Nash quantity. This simply requires 
a minimal understanding that there may be an advantage in trying to collude, as opposed to 
even implicitly potentially relying on any explicit coordination on a specific production 
value. We are not the first to establish a positive link between collusion and delegation,7 but 
our experiment is the first to analyze the role of institutional delegation for a varying number 
of interacting firms (2 and 4). 
Silverman et al.’s (2012) experiment looked at the effect of authority on public good 
contribution. The paper is about inducing tax compliance; they varied the source of expertise 
unclear whether this cartel would at all have been detected by authorities if not for a cartel 
member itself (ABB in that case) blowing the whistle. 
6 An additional benefit of  delegation is to “shield their involvement [into illegal collusive 
activities] by delegating operations to their hapless subordinates” (Baker and Faulkner, 1993, 
p.855, content of square brackets added). 
7 Fershtman et al. (1991) argued that, if decisions were delegated, and there existed a high 
degree of commitment (i.e. the contract between principals with their agents was public 
knowledge, something which however may be impractical under antitrust laws) no formal 
agreement between the principals is needed to facilitate collusion. 
                                                                                                                                                        
supporting the nudge they provided (a recommendation to make a given public good 
contribution) and whether there was a penalty in case of audit. They found an effect of their 
nudge variable, but no evidence for a role of the source of expertise and only weak evidence 
in favor of an effect of an explanation for the nudge.8 Their work is complementary to ours in 
linking a decision setting in the broad class of social dilemmas to deference to authority. 
Their game and focus is different from ours and their paper does not vary the number of 
interacting players, which is essential to our experiment. They also had nudge reminders 
every round, whereas our manipulation is quite weaker as there was only one reminder in our 
sequence of 24 rounds.9 
In our experiment we vary the number of firms (2 or 4), whether there is a nudge to collude, 
whether there is an explanation for the nudge, whether the nudge was common or private 
knowledge, and the content of the nudge. Our key finding is that our nudge is equally 
effective in reducing the market quantity with 2 and 4 firms, and an explanation for the nudge 
is not needed to achieve this result. Even removing the element of common knowledge did 
not significantly reduce the level of collusion. Furthermore, just pointing in the ‘right 
direction’ is enough for increasing collusion. If we label as a compliance effect the pure effect 
of deference towards the nudge by the authority and a coordination effect the effect of 
coordinating to a common sunspot provided by common knowledge of a nudge on a specific 
production value, we are able to distinguish a compliance effect towards collusion from a 
8 Specifically, an effect is found at p<0.05 only in one of the regressions once a number of 
covariates are added, and only as an interaction term.  
9 Because of their different motivation, they also employ a random matching of players across 
rounds, whereas for us (interacting firms in an oligopolistic market) a fixed matching is more 
appropriate. 
                                                 
coordination effect, and to find evidence for the former. In section 2 we introduce the 
experimental design and state our hypotheses before we present the results in section 3. 
Section 4 discusses our findings and section 5 concludes. 
2. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Experimental Parameters 
We used a Cournot type market with homogenous products, linear production costs and a 
linear demand function and parameterized it identically to Huck et al. (2007, 2004b) and 
Requate and Waichman (2010). That is, we used an inverse demand function of 𝑃 =max (100 − 𝑄, 0) with 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖2,4𝑖=1  and constant marginal costs equal to 1 (𝐶(𝑞𝑖) = 𝑞𝑖). The 
Nash prediction for the production quantity of firm 𝑖 writes as 𝑞𝑖𝑁 = 99/(𝑛 + 1)  which for 
the four player case is 𝑞𝑖𝑁 = 99/5 = 19.8, and for the two player case is 𝑞𝑖𝑁 = 99/3 = 33. 
The collusive prediction is 𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑙 = 99/2𝑛, which for the four player case is 𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑙 4 = 99/8 =12.375 and for the two player case is 𝑞𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑙 2 = 99/4 = 24.75. 
Procedures 
We used a fixed matching protocol. At the start of the session, depending on the treatment 
two or four subjects formed a group, and its composition did not change throughout the entire 
session. Each session lasted for two stages of 12 rounds each. Subjects were able to use a 
profit calculator to get an understanding of market demand and of the relevance of the other 
subjects’ actions on their own income.10 They were told they would receive additional 
instructions at the beginning of stage 2 (round 13); these instructions just contained 
10 Requate and Waichman (2010) found no significant difference between the use of profit 
calculators and payoff tables as a means of presentation. 
                                                 
reminders. We used a market oriented frame to present the instructions (see Fonseca and 
Normann, 2012).11 The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was 
run at the CBESS laboratory at the University of East Anglia. A random round payment 
mechanism was implemented.12 The number of independent observations (groups) was 
almost equally distributed across treatments (12 groups in treatments A4, EA4, PA4 PAL4, 
B2, A2, EA2, PA2 and PAL2 and 11 groups in treatment B4). On average one session lasted 
70 minutes and 212 subjects on average earned 18.75 pounds each. 
Treatments 
We employed a 2 (market size) x 5 (levels of authority) full factorial design. The following 
five treatments were both implemented in 2-firms and 4-firms market settings. 
Baseline (B) 
11 Huck et al. (2004b) showed that whether an experiment is framed in an economically 
sensible or entirely neutral way can, but does not necessarily have to have an effect on 
behavior. Whereas in a five players Cournot setting Huck et al. (2004b) did not find any 
difference between the frames, the neutral frame caused significantly more competitive 
behavior in a two player situation. Although significant, the difference in means was only one 
unit, a qualitatively rather small difference, given a choice set of 0-100 and a range of useful 
strategies from 66 (Nash) and 49.5 (collusion). 
12 The profits of one randomly chosen round per stage were added up and converted into 
pounds at an exchange rate of 80 ECU = 1 pound. A participation fee of 3 pounds was added 
to the final earnings. We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to invite for the sessions and did not 
restrict the CBESS subject pool. 
                                                 
In the Baseline treatment subjects simply repeatedly interacted in the Cournot market laid out 
above for 24 periods. 
Authority (A) 
In the Authority treatment the instructions were exactly the same as in B but one additional 
sentence was added, nudging subjects to produce a particular quantity. After the text of the 
Baseline instructions the following was added: “You are entirely free to produce as few or as 
many units of output as you like (from 0 to 100). That said, we would ask you (and your co-
participants) to produce 12.4 units of output. We are telling this not just to you but also to 
your co-participants” (in the 2-firms setting 12.4 was replaced by 24.8). A reminder of this, 
and only one reminder, was given at the beginning of the second stage. The requested 
production quantity (either 24.8 or 12.4 units of output) was exactly equal to the collusive 
output level for the respective market size. 
Explaining Authority (EA) 
In the Explaining Authority treatment, we used exactly the same instructions as in Authority, 
but explained why it would be beneficial for the subjects to obey the nudge by adding the 
following: “The reason you should do this is that, if you and your co-participants produce 
12.4 units of output, the total profits of you and your co-participants will be the highest. You 
can use the profit calculator to check the profitability of producing 12.4 units of output per 
firm.”13 There was a corresponding reminder, and only one, at the beginning of the second 
stage. 
Private Authority (PA) 
13 The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
In contrast to the Authority treatment, in the Private Authority treatment, the number 
requested was not common information but subjects were asked to produce a specific number 
in private, i.e. they did not receive any information about the quantity we requested from any 
of their co-subjects.14 Subjects were reminded on that quantity once, and only once, at the 
beginning of the second stage. 
Private Authority Less (PAL) 
The Private Authority Less treatment was similar to the Private Authority treatment; 
however, we did not ask subjects to produce the collusive level, but simply to produce less 
than the Nash quantity (stated as a number). This request was communicated in private. 
Subjects were reminded of their number at the beginning of the second stage. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: In the B 4-firms treatment, on average firms set their production 
around the Nash equilibrium level. In the B 2-firms treatment, groups collude more 
than 4-firms groups. 
With the same parameters, Huck et al. (2004b) found that most markets in a 4 firms setting 
produced around 75 units (close to the Nash equilibrium of 79.2 units). We expect subjects to 
behave similarly to Huck et al.’s (2004b) in the Baseline.15 Both theoretical (Fouraker and 
Siegel, 1963; Selten, 1973) and empirical (Dolbear et al., 1968; Gürerk and Selten, 2012; 
Huck et al., 2007, 2004) results suggest that increasing market size decreases the ability to 
collude. Therefore, we expect that 2-firms groups collude more than 4-firms groups. 
14 In the PA treatment no explanation similar to the EA treatment was provided. 
15 For a game-theoretical analysis of a comparable setting see Selten (1973). 
                                                 
Hypothesis 2: Nudging subjects to produce the collusive quantity (treatments A, EA, 
PA) or to produce less than the Nash quantity (treatment PAL) reduces the total 
output below the Nash output level, both for 2-firms and 4-firms markets. 
As discussed in the introduction, we expect the provision of the nudge to reduce production 
levels and increase collusion as a result of deference to authority and common knowledge. 
Hypothesis 3: In the EA treatment quantities produced are lower than in the A 
treatment, both in 2-firms and 4-firms markets. 
As in Karakostas and Zizzo (2012) and Silverman et al. (2012), we expect that explaining the 
usefulness of obeying the nudge should, if anything, further increase compliance with the 
requested production level. 
Hypothesis 4: In the PA and PAL treatments, quantities produced are higher than in 
the A treatment but lower than the Nash prediction, both in 2-firms and 4-firms 
markets. 
We expect any effect caused by the A treatment to have two causes: a coordination effect due 
to the fact of commonly knowing the quantity we asked all subjects to produce and a 
compliance effect of being deferential towards an authority. The PA and PAL treatments 
enable us to control for the coordination effect. The difference between production in the A 
treatment and production in the PA treatment measures the extent to which there is a 
coordination effect due to common knowledge. The difference between production in the PA 
treatment and production in the PAL treatment measures the extent to which there is a 
coordination effect due to a nudge (even if private) on a common production value. The 
nudge in the PAL treatment simply requires a minimal understanding that there may be an 
advantage in trying to collude, which we believe is entirely plausible to assume in real world 
settings without the need of a central planner helping to coordinate – a point which we 
elaborate further in the discussion section. Under this assumption, therefore, the difference 
between production in the PAL treatment and production in the B treatment measures the 
extent to which there is compliance effect due to deference to authority controlling for both 
sources of coordination effects. Our hypothesis is that, while there is some coordination 
effect, there is also a compliance effect. 
Hypothesis 5: 2-player groups reduce their average production by a larger extent as 
compared to 4-player groups, if requested to do so (treatments A, EA, PA and PAL).  
As the opportunity costs of obeying the production request (i.e. unilaterally reducing the own 
production quantity below the Nash output level) are higher in 4-player than in a 2-player 
settings (e.g., see Selten, 1973), we expect any requests to have a stronger effect in 2-player 
than in 4-player settings. 
3. Results 
Testing the Hypotheses 
Figure 1 and Table 1 summarize the results of our experiment.16 
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here] 
Result 1: Hypothesis 1’s prediction of more collusion in 2-firms markets than in 4-
firms markets is not supported. Production levels in the B treatment in both market 
sizes are not significantly different from the Nash prediction. 
16 We used the software packages R and STATA to analyze the experimental data. 
                                                 
Support: 
In order to make production levels comparable across market sizes, we follow the approach 
of Huck et al. (2004b) and compute the ratio of the average total quantity in the market to the 
total quantity predicted by the Nash equilibrium: that is, the Nash ratio is 𝑟 = 𝑄𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑄𝑁𝑎𝑠ℎ⁄ . 
Comparing the Nash ratios of 2-firms and 4-firms markets in B reveals that, in smaller 
markets, firms produce slightly less. However, this difference is not significant (Wilcoxon, 
p=0.695). Both in 2-firms and 4-firms markets the actually observed production quantities 
(measured in 𝑟) do not differ from the Nash prediction of 1 (sign tests, p=1 and p=0.549 for 
2-firms and 4-firms markets, respectively).17 
Result 2: Hypothesis 2 is supported. Relative to the B treatment, subjects reduced 
their production output if nudged to do so (treatments A, EA, PA and PAL). 
Support 
Table 1 shows a fall in overall production as a result of the nudge: in the 2-firms markets, 
mean production goes down from about 66 in the B treatment to 63 in the PA and PAL 
treatment and further to 58-60 in the A and EA treatments; in the 4-firms markets, mean 
production goes down from about 82-83 in the B treatment to 75-78 in the PA and PAL 
treatment and further to 73-74 in the A and EA treatments.18 These quantities are 
17 All bivariate tests in this paper are reported as two sided and computed on session averages 
per group of subjects to control for within-session non independence of observations. 
18 In the 2-firms case A, EA, PA and PAL at least marginally reduced production (one-sided 
Wilcoxon tests) with p=0.007, p=0.019, p=0.039 and p=0.067, respectively. In the 4-firms 
case A, EA, PA and PAL also resulted in lower production levels, significant at p=0.009, 
                                                 
significantly higher than if the nudge had been precisely followed in terms of requested 
production (sign tests, all p<0.01), but they are also lower than the Nash equilibrium 
predictions.19 This result is especially important for the PAL treatment where the (successful) 
private nudge only asked subjects to produce less than the Nash quantity. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 looks at this matter further by running regressions on Nash ratios (with random 
intercepts on subjects nested in markets to control for non-independence of observations). 
The independent variables include treatment dummies (A, EA, PA and PAL = 1 in the 
respective treatments; 2 Firms = 1 in 2-firms markets; interaction dummies); period and stage 
dummies (Period and Period2, Period 13 = 1 in Period 13 and Stage 2 = 1 in Periods 13-24); 
plus additional controls.20 All regression models are consistent in pointing to a reduction of 
p=0.067, p=0.132 and p=0.052, respectively. There is no statistically significant evidence that 
the number of firms impacts on the size of the nudge effect, as demonstrated by the 
statistically insignificance of the interaction terms with the 2 firms dummy in Table 2. 
19 In 2-firms markets production was significantly lower than the Nash equilibrium prediction 
(one-sided sign tests: A, EA, PA and PAL with p=0.003, p=0.019, p=0.003 and p=0.073, 
respectively). In 4-firms markets production also decreased; however, only qualitatively in 
the case of EA and PA (one-sided sign tests: A, EA, PA and PAL with p<0.001, p=0.194, 
p=0.613 and p=0.073, respectively).  
20 Soc.Des. is a social desirability index collected from a 16-items questionnaire at the end 
(Stöber, 2001) that provides a psychological measure of sensitivity to social pressure. Male 
(=1 with male subjects), Economics (=1 for subjects with an Economics background), and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Nash ratio of between 11 and 12%, indicating more collusion on average in the A, EA, 
PA and PAL treatments.21 All interaction terms with the 2 Firms dummies are insignificant, 
pointing to a robustness of the finding to whether firms are 2 or 4. 
Result 3: Hypothesis 3 is not supported. There is no evidence supporting lower 
production in the EA treatment than in the A treatment. 
Support 
Table 1 makes this clear by showing that aggregate production level in each market was the 
same on average between A and EA +/- about 1 unit, and regardless of whether a 2-firms or a 
4-firms market is considered.22 The regression results of Table 2 show a similar picture, as 
the regression coefficient for the EA dummy is not significant at conventional levels (with 
Authority being the baseline treatment in Table 2). 
Age are also included in some regressions. None of these variables is significant and we shall 
not refer to them further. 
21 As Authority is used as the baseline treatment in the regressions, a significant coefficient of 
the treatment dummy B, but no significant coefficient of the other treatment dummies means 
that production quantities in EA, PA and PAL are not significantly different from A. Whereas 
the coefficients of EA and PAL are significantly different from the coefficient of B (Wald 
tests: both p<0.05), the coefficient of PA is not (p>0.1). 
22 In both 2-firms and 4-firms markets there is no statistically significant difference between 
A and EA (Wilcoxon tests, p=0.799 and p=0.977, respectively). This result is confirmed by 
the regression analysis of Table 2. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Result 4: We find only mild support for hypothesis 4. The production levels in the PA 
and PAL treatments are only qualitatively higher than in the A treatment, with that for 
PA sitting half way between collusive production and Nash quantity, and that for PAL 
being of similar value. 
Support 
The production levels observed in PA were 78.4 and 62.6 for 4-firms and 2-firms markets, 
respectively. This is slightly but not significantly higher than in the A treatment (Wilcoxon 
test: p=0.128 and p=0.347 for 4-firms and 2-firms markets respectively). The production in 
the PA treatment was significantly lower than the Nash prediction for 2-firms markets (sign 
test: p=0.006), but in 4-firms markets the decrease in production is much smaller and not 
significant (sign test: p=1). The production level observed in the PAL treatment does not 
point to an increase relative to the PA treatment. 
In the regression analysis of Table 2, both the PA and PAL coefficients are not statistically 
different from those on A and EA.23 The coefficient of PA lies almost exactly half way 
between the coefficients of B and the other treatments with a point nudge, i.e. A and EA, 
while the coefficient on PAL is clearly not higher than that on PA (if anything, the reverse, 
though statistically insignificantly so). The comparison between PA and PAL provides no 
support for a coordination effect due to a nudge on a common specific production value, but 
the regression analysis points both to a coordination effect due to common knowledge and to 
a compliance effect due to deference towards the authority (see Table 2).  
23 Wald tests: all p>0.1. Tables A2-1 and A2-2 in the appendix contain the regression results 
of 4-firms and 2-firms markets, respectively.  
                                                 
Result 5: Against hypothesis 5, we find no difference between 2-firms and 4-firms 
groups in terms of reaction intensity for all nudge treatments (A, EA, PA and PAL).  
Support 
The magnitude of the reduction in output in the nudge treatments did not appear to be a 
function of market size. While the regression analysis in Table 2 finds a significant main 
effect of the baseline treatment being different from the authority treatment, the respective 
interaction terms with market size are far from being significant. The results of running 
regressions on 2-firms and 4-firms markets separately are almost identical to the joint 
regression results (see Tables B1 and B2). 
Supplementary Analysis 
Time trend 
As shown by Table 1, we find that there is a tendency for production to be reduced in the B 
treatment if one compares the first six with the last six rounds; this tends to reduce the gap 
with the A, EA, PA and PAL treatments. Nevertheless, the nudges appear to produce more 
collusion from the beginning, and this is what is being picked up by result 2.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Precise production matches 
There is additional evidence that the nudges mattered. Table 3 presents the proportions of 
quantities chosen by firms that were precisely identical to the Nash equilibrium level, and to 
the requested amount in the A, EA and PA treatments, of 12.4 or 24.8 units. In the A, EA and 
PA treatments, subjects exactly followed the request to produce the specific quantity of 12.4 
or 24.8 units in 972 (out of 5184) cases, against 0 cases in which these quantities were 
produced in the B treatment.24  
Interestingly, while in the EA treatment the percentage of precise compliance to the nudge 
was of the order of 22-30%, this roughly halved to 9-14% in the A treatment (Wilcoxon test, 
p=0.079 for 2-firms markets and p=0.022 for 4-firms markets). The percentage of precise 
compliance to the nudge in the PA treatment was comparable to that in the A treatment (12-
17%; in comparing PA and A treatments, Wilcoxon test p=0.583 and p=0.161 for 2-fims and 
4-firms markets, respectively). This provides further support for a compliance effect 
independent of a coordination effect, as precise compliance takes place roughly to the same 
degree whether or not there is common knowledge of a common nudge.25 
4. Discussion 
There is a ‘collusion puzzle’ to explain the difference between the robust lab finding that 
having more than two firms competing in a market drastically reduces the ability to collude 
(Huck et al., 2004) whereas in the real world collusion can be observed with a larger number 
of firms as well (Davies et al., 2011; Davies and Olczak, 2008). The experiment presented in 
this paper is one piece of a jigsaw puzzle to explain these contrasting findings. While other 
factors are clearly at work, such as communication (Fonseca and Normann, 2012), we have 
24 A reviewer asked how many individuals chose the one-shot best response to the collusive 
outcome. This almost never happened, at least precisely (0 out of 3456 cases in 4-firms 
treatments and only 9 out of 1728 cases in 2-firms treatments). Further analysis on this 
possible heuristic, with limited supportive evidence, is presented in Appendix 2. 
25 Analyzing the response dynamics across treatments following the procedure used by Huck 
et al. (1999) revealed that the heuristic used most often was ‘Best response’. For details see 
Appendix 2. 
                                                 
shown that a combination of delegation about production decisions and deference to the 
authority can also operate: we observed an increase in collusion of roughly the same size (in 
terms of Nash ratios) regardless of whether we had 2 or 4 firms. 
The effect may have been further combined with a coordination effect, i.e. by having 
common knowledge (treatments A and EA, for Authority and Explaining Authority 
respectively) and asking decision makers to produce a specific output level we created a 
salient focal point for coordination. One potential source of the coordination effect is the 
common knowledge, and we are able to identify this source by implementing the Private 
Authority (PA) treatment. We found that a coordination effect due to common knowledge is 
accountable for about half of the difference between the baseline and treatment A, with no 
statistically significant difference however between A and PA.  
Another potential source of the coordination effect is the fact that we provide a specific 
production value. One might argue that, even in the PA treatment, a central planner 
(experimenter) nudges those in charge of the market variable towards this specific value, but 
there is no equivalent central planner in real world settings as otherwise collusion would be 
organized as an explicit cartel and not tacit anymore. The Private Authority Less (PAL) 
treatment enables us to identify whether there is a coordination effect of this kind. In this 
treatment subjects are simply told to produce less than the Nash quantity. This simply 
requires a minimal understanding that there may be an advantage in trying to collude, which 
we believe is entirely plausible to assume in real world settings without the need of a central 
planner.26 
26 A counterargument would be that this treatment provides direct information on the Nash 
quantity. However, it is entirely clear from the baseline treatments that subjects rapidly 
converge to the Nash quantity regardless of being given this information directly. This is 
                                                 
To elaborate on this, anyone who understood the basic dynamics of the game should be able 
to anticipate that if all market subjects jointly reduced their production quantity below the 
Nash quantity, up to a point, everyone would make higher profits. The only assumption that 
has to hold for translating our PAL environment to a real world setting is that senior 
managers understand this basic intuition, whether from their own experience, from corporate 
learning, or from a basic economics or business textbook. We find this assumption to be 
generally minimal and plausible. 
We also found a significant increase in precise compliance rates – i.e. of subjects precisely 
following the nudge - in the EA as compared to the A treatment. The provision of an 
explanation roughly doubled the proportion of subjects who followed the request to the point 
and significantly reduced overproduction in both market sizes. If our findings were purely 
driven by coordination effects, we should not have observed this difference between the EA 
and the A treatments, which in fact we did. Although we find strong EA vs. A treatment 
differences on the individual level, it appears that, given market response dynamics, these 
differences average out on a market level. This lack of an aggregate difference between the 
EA and A treatments is, of course, consistent with what Silverman et al. (2012) found in their 
different setting. Interestingly, and again in support of a compliance effect, the lack of 
common knowledge did not lead subjects to change the degree to which they followed the 
nudge precisely, as the percentages were the same in the A and PA treatments.   
entirely in line with previous experimental work, and after all is straightforward for subjects 
to find the Nash quantity by using the profit calculator. Subjects, on average, were well 
capable of finding the Nash quantity without the experimenter explicitly revealing it to them. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Many corporate decisions are made in an institutional framework with superiors and 
subordinates. This naturally points to the question of whether and to what extent nudges from 
the higher level can facilitate collusion among delegated middle managers charged to set 
production levels. Although some studies formally showed that delegating a strategic 
decision could serve as a commitment device, we are only aware of one paper that tested such 
implications experimentally.27 Huck et al. (2004a) analyzed the actions of owners and 
managers in a two-stage Cournot setting. First, owners chose one of two possible contracts 
which they offered to their managers. All contracts offered were common knowledge among 
all players. Second, managers set the production quantities for their firms. The managers’ 
production decisions were highly dependent on the owners’ contract choices, i.e. managers 
used the signals they received from their own as well as their opponent’s owner and reacted 
to them by setting their production levels accordingly.  
While Huck et al. (2004a) explicitly assigned subjects to the roles of both owners and 
managers (2 each), we exogenously provide the owners’ request and let all subjects play the 
role of managers only. Our implementation of delegation in the laboratory is stylized and 
exploits the fact that the experimenter can be seen an authority towards the experimental 
subjects (Karakostas and Zizzo, 2012; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2013; Silverman et al., 
2012; Zizzo, 2010). We do not manipulate the nature of the authority in our experiment but 
this has been looked upon by Silverman et al. (2012) in their public good contribution setting, 
and could clearly be looked at in future research of ours.  
27 In their theoretical analyses Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) and Vickers (1985) 
predict that strategically delegating decisions about production quantities could result in a 
higher than beneficial output which in turn decreased the profits of the delegating firms. In 
that sense delegation would not be advisable to firms. 
                                                 
Our manipulation of delegation was obviously very stylized. One obvious question for future 
research is how the results would change if it were known that complying with the 
instructions is “illegal”, or if there were the possibility of punishment. In these scenarios, 
arguably it would be in the advantage of the higher level executives not to provide an 
explanation for the nudge. Even in our experiment, explanations have no positive effects on 
collusion. In a setting where punishment is possible, there would be clear reasons for 
avoiding them as subordinates may potentially be less likely to follow the request if they 
knew it was illegal; it also would increase the number of potential witnesses in case of a trial 
(Baker and Faulkner, 1993) or even encourage whistle-blowers to step forward. 
Other natural world dimensions of delegation could work in the direction of making our 
results stronger (e.g. incentivized contracts, pressure from the superior officer, no anonymity 
etc.). If already simply being asked to do something could significantly affect behavior 
(although complying individually was clearly payoff-dominated by not complying), making 
the request stronger or making non-compliance a very unfavorable choice for the decision 
maker would potentially achieve higher collusion rates than found in this experiment. 
Clearly, future research is needed.28 
A complementary interpretation of our findings is methodological, in that they show how 
experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010) can affect behavior even in market settings. This 
28 In our experiment we deliberately nudged people towards the collusive output (in 
treatments A, EA and PA). Alternatively, one could imagine nudging people towards a less 
favorable production level. Another extension of our work could be along the lines of 
increasing the numbers of firms in the markets further; for example, Fonseca and Normann 
(2012) consider 6-firms and 8-firms markets. 
                                                 
is an interesting and perhaps surprising result given the comparatively weak nature of the 
nudges provided, particularly in the PAL treatment.  
5. Conclusion 
A ‘collusion puzzle’ exists between, on the one hand, the fact that increasing the number of 
firms should reduce the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in 
experimental markets with three or more firms; and, on the other hand, the fact that in natural 
oligopolistic markets there are cases of larger number of firms tacitly colluding (Davies et al., 
2011; Sen, 2003). We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential 
towards an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to 
middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but 
also with four firms. We cannot rule out a coordination effect due to common knowledge by 
the firms that the same nudge is being given to other firms. We find however no evidence for 
a coordination effect due to an implied central planner requesting to producing the collusive 
output. A nudge simply suggesting to produce less than the Nash quantity was as effective as 
a nudge suggesting to produce the collusive outcome. We believe that it a plausible 
assumption that (most) real world senior managers understand the basic intuition that trying 
to produce less can be jointly profitable. 
Controlling for coordination effects, we are able to identify a compliance effect from 
deference to authority. Based on the experimental results we have presented, if firms want to 
engage in collusion, delegating decisions internally could be a useful device to exploit 
deference to authority as a way of facilitating it. 
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VI - Tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the average total quantities per market 
    Players Nash Coll. B A EA PA PAL  Overall 
Overall 
mean 
(median) 
4 79.2 49.5 
82.5 
(77.0) 
73.1 
(72.8) 
73.7 
(69.8) 
78.4 
(74.7) 
75.3 
(74.0) 
76.5 
(74.0) 
2 66.0 49.5 
65.9 
(64.2) 
58.5 
(59.8) 
59.7 
(60.0) 
62.6 
(63.2) 
63.1 
(64.0) 
61.9 
(62.8) 
Nash 
ratio 
4 1.0 0.63 1.04 0.92 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.97 
2 1.0 0.75 1.00 0.89 0.90 0.95 0.96 0.94 
First six 
periods 
only 
mean 
(median) 
4 79.2 49.5 
91.2 
(82.0) 
77.7 
(75.8) 
73.3 
(69.9) 
81.4 
(67.8) 
72.8 
(68.0) 
79.1 
(72.0) 
2 66.0 49.5 
66.4 
(65.0) 
57.9 
(56.5) 
55.1 
(55.0) 
61.7 
(62.5) 
64.2 
(63.0) 
61.1 
(60.0) 
Nash 
ratio 
4 1.0 0.63 1.15 0.98 0.93 1.03 0.92 1.00 
2 1.0 0.75 1.01 0.88 0.84 0.93 0.97 0.93 
Last six 
periods 
mean 
(median) 4 79.2 49.5 
76.6 
(76.5) 
73.6 
(74.5) 
72.6 
(69.8) 
75.9 
(75.0) 
77.5 
(76.5) 
75.2 
(74.8) 
only 
2 66.0 49.5 
63.7 
(64.0) 
59.4 
(61.0) 
62.6 
(61.9) 
62.9 
(64.9) 
61.7 
(64.0) 
62.1 
(64.0) 
Nash 
ratio 
4 1.0 0.63 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.95 
2 1.0 0.75 0.97 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 
 
Notes: B, A, EA, PA and PAL denote the treatments Baseline, Authority, Explaining Authority, Private Authority and Private Authority Less, 
respectively. Nash denotes the Nash-Cournot prediction and Coll. describes the collusive output level. The Nash ratio is defined as the actual 
market production divided by Nash prediction for the overall market production. 
 
Table 2: Regressions on group level Nash ratios (r) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
B 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
  (0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0457) (0.0456) 
EA 0.00792 0.00792 0.00792 0.00774 
  (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0446) 
PA 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0665 
  (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0447) 
PAL  0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0274 
  (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0446) 
2 firms -0.0372 -0.0372 -0.0372 -0.0377 
  (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0451) 
B x 2 firms -0.00592 -0.00592 -0.00592 -0.00565 
  (0.0646) (0.0646) (0.0646) (0.0645) 
EA x 2 firms 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104 0.0112 
  (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0639) 
PA x 2 firms -0.00427 -0.00427 -0.00427 -0.00376 
  (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0639) 
PAL x 2 firms 0.0423 0.0423 0.0423 0.0430 
  (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0638) 
Period 1   0.193*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 
    (0.0123) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
Period 13   -0.0437*** -0.0352** -0.0352** 
    (0.0123) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Period     0.00641*** 0.00641*** 
      (0.00189) (0.00189) 
Period2     -0.000159** -0.000159** 
      (0.0000658) (0.0000658) 
Stage 2     -0.0316*** -0.0316*** 
      (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Soc.Des.       -0.0000978 
        (0.000999) 
Male       0.00132 
        (0.00642) 
Age       0.000148 
        (0.000818) 
Economics       0.00172 
        (0.00687) 
Constant 0.923*** 0.917*** 0.883*** 0.880*** 
  (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0332) (0.0389) 
Observations 8544 8544 8544 8544 
Log. Likelihood 246.8 376.2 383.4 383.5 
Chi-squared 18.74 281.5 296.4 296.6 
 
 Notes: The baseline for the above regressions is the 4 firms Authority (a) treatment. B, EA, 
PA and PAL represent dummies for the Baseline, Explaining Authority, Private Authority 
and Private Authority Less treatment, respectively. 2 Firms and Stage 2 denote dummies for a 
market size of 2 and the Periods 13-24 respectively. The dummies Period 1 and Period 13 
take the value of 1 in period 1 and 13 (when subjects were reminded of the nudge), 
respectively and 0 otherwise; Soc.Des. denotes a numeric measure for social desirability. Age 
is the numeric age in years. Male and Economics are dummies that are one if the participant 
was male and an economics major, respectively. All columns contain coefficients of linear 
random intercept models clustered by subjects nested in sessions; standard errors in 
parentheses.29 Significance levels of coefficients: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
  
29 We did not estimate a Tobit model as the lowest and highest observed values for the group 
Nash ratios were 0.15 and 3.36, respectively. 
                                                 
Table 3: Proportion of production quantities less than, equal to and greater than the 
requested quantity and the proportion of production quantities equal to the theoretical 
Nash prediction 
  Treatment   
Less than 
x 
Exactly 
x 
More than 
x 
  
Exactly 
Nash 
Overall 
B4   0.33 0.00 0.67   0.00 
A4   0.18 0.14 0.68   0.00 
EA4   0.16 0.30 0.54   0.00 
PA4   0.12 0.17 0.72   0.00 
PAL4   0.65 0.05 0.30   0.05 
B2   0.11 0.00 0.89   0.05 
A2   0.14 0.09 0.77   0.02 
EA2   0.12 0.22 0.66   0.02 
PA2   0.07 0.16 0.76   0.06 
PAL2   0.59 0.28 0.13   0.28 
First 
six 
periods 
only 
B4   0.47 0.00 0.53   0.00 
A4   0.25 0.15 0.60   0.00 
EA4   0.21 0.37 0.42   0.00 
PA4   0.25 0.18 0.57   0.00 
PAL4   0.74 0.02 0.25   0.02 
B2   0.20 0.00 0.80   0.02 
A2   0.27 0.04 0.69   0.00 
EA2   0.25 0.23 0.52   0.01 
PA2   0.17 0.15 0.69   0.03 
PAL2   0.56 0.26 0.18   0.26 
Last 
six 
periods 
B4   0.24 0.00 0.76   0.00 
A4   0.10 0.11 0.79   0.00 
EA4   0.14 0.23 0.63   0.00 
only PA4   0.06 0.14 0.81   0.01 
PAL4   0.61 0.05 0.34   0.05 
B2   0.09 0.00 0.91   0.02 
A2   0.06 0.15 0.79   0.03 
EA2   0.01 0.19 0.79   0.05 
PA2   0.03 0.19 0.78   0.15 
PAL2   0.59 0.29 0.12   0.29 
 
Notes: B, A, EA, PA and PAL denote the treatments Baseline, Authority, Explaining 
Authority, Private Authority and Private Authority Less, respectively. The numbers 4 and 2 
indicate the number of firms in the market. The value of x refers to the number that 
participants were asked to produce in the A, EA and PA treatments and the number 
participants were asked to undercut in the treatments PAL (note that for PAL treatments 
column Exactly x and Exactly Nash are identical).
Table A2-1: Regressions on group level Nash ratios (r), 4-firms treatments only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
B 0.119** 0.119** 0.119** 0.119** 
  (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0476) 
EA 0.00792 0.00792 0.00792 0.00815 
  (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) 
PA 0.0668 0.0668 0.0668 0.0671 
  (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0467) 
PAL  0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0276 
  (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0466) 
Period 1   0.299*** 0.324*** 0.324*** 
    (0.0164) (0.0199) (0.0199) 
Period 13   -0.0408** -0.0265 -0.0265 
    (0.0164) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Period     0.00615** 0.00615** 
      (0.00253) (0.00253) 
Period2     -0.000134 -0.000134 
      (0.0000878) (0.0000878) 
Stage 2     -0.0408*** -0.0408*** 
      (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Soc.Des.       0.0000531 
        (0.00131) 
Male       -0.000335 
        (0.00808) 
Age       -0.0000114 
        (0.00106) 
Economics       0.00179 
        (0.00871) 
Constant 0.923*** 0.912*** 0.881*** 0.881*** 
  (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0357) (0.0445) 
Observations 5664 5664 5664 5664 
Log. 
Likelihood -364.1 -197.7 -192.7 -192.6 
Chi-squared 8.474 351.3 362.0 362.1 
 
Notes: The baseline for the above regressions is the 4 firms Authority (A) treatment. B, EA, 
PA and PAL represent dummies for the Baseline, Explaining Authority, Private Authority 
and Private Authority Less treatment, respectively. Stage 2, Period 1 and Period 13 denote 
dummies for the Periods 13-24, Period 1only  and Period 13 only, respectively; Soc.Des. 
denotes a numeric measure for social desirability. Age is the numeric age in years. Male and 
Economics are dummies that are one if the subject was male and an economics major, 
respectively. All columns contain coefficients of linear random intercept models clustered by 
subjects nested in sessions; standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels of coefficients: 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
  
Table A2-2: Regressions on group level Nash ratios (r), 2-firms treatments only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
B 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 
  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0433) 
EA 0.0183 0.0183 0.0183 0.0194 
  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) 
PA 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0628 
  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0433) 
PAL  0.0696 0.0696 0.0696 0.0709 
  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) 
Period 1   -0.0170 0.0149 0.0149 
    (0.0163) (0.0198) (0.0198) 
Period 13   -0.0495*** -0.0522*** -0.0522*** 
    (0.0163) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Period     0.00690*** 0.00690*** 
      (0.00251) (0.00251) 
Period2     -0.000206** -0.000206** 
      (0.0000871) (0.0000871) 
Stage 2     -0.0136 -0.0136 
      (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Soc.Des.       -0.000231 
        (0.00140) 
Male       0.00402 
        (0.0101) 
Age       0.000358 
        (0.00119) 
Economics       0.00193 
        (0.0105) 
Constant 0.886*** 0.889*** 0.850*** 0.841*** 
  (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0336) (0.0450) 
Observations 2880 2880 2880 2880 
Log. 
Likelihood 848.0 853.0 857.1 857.3 
Chi-squared 8.459 18.52 26.75 27.18 
 
Notes: The baseline for the above regressions is the 2 firms Authority (A) treatment. B, EA, 
PA and PAL represent dummies for the Baseline, Explaining Authority, Private Authority 
and Private Authority Less treatment, respectively. Stage 2, Period1 and Period 13 denote 
dummies for the Periods 13-24, Period 1 only and Period 13 only, respectively; Soc.Des. 
denotes a numeric measure for social desirability. Age is the numeric age in years. Male and 
Economics are dummies that are one if the subject was male and an economics major, 
respectively. All columns contain coefficients of linear random intercept models clustered by 
subjects nested in sessions; standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels of coefficients: 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table A2-3: Regressions on change in individual quantity (𝒒𝒕 − 𝒒𝒕−𝟏), specification 1 
  All periods 
Part A B4 A4 EA4 PA4 PAL4 B2 A2 EA2 PA2 PAL2 
Best response to 
   previous round 
0.321*** 0.254*** 0.228*** 0.318*** 0.320*** 0.273*** 0.244** 0.177*** 0.284*** 0.371*** 
(0.0625) (0.0388) (0.0522) (0.0524) (0.0447) (0.0639) (0.0924) (0.0469) (0.0668) (0.0623) 
Imitate the average 
   of the previous round 
0.140*** 0.227** 0.157*** 0.294*** 0.153*** 0.161** 0.113* 0.110** 0.0107 0.116*** 
(0.0487) (0.108) (0.0507) (0.0960) (0.0518) (0.0587) (0.0641) (0.0443) (0.0281) (0.0381) 
Follow the nudge   0.188** 0.132 0.0886     0.303*** 0.137* 0.0937   
    (0.0790) (0.0808) (0.0742)     (0.0733) (0.0667) (0.0675)   
Observations 1012 1104 1104 1104 1104 552 552 552 552 552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.272 0.389 0.272 0.406 0.286 0.254 0.342 0.234 0.256 0.287 
                      
  Period 13 only 
Part B B4 A4 EA4 PA4 PAL4 B2 A2 EA2 PA2 PAL2 
Best response to 
   previous round 
-0.0375 0.0203 0.270*** 0.0578 0.333** 0.191** 0.0264 -0.336* -0.245* 0.376* 
(0.310) (0.123) (0.0960) (0.117) (0.137) (0.0858) (0.117) (0.184) (0.124) (0.202) 
Imitate the average 
   of the previous round 
0.479** 0.447** -0.0190 0.0781 0.121 0.274 -0.00134 0.290** 0.00534 0.275** 
(0.192) (0.174) (0.0905) (0.0831) (0.114) (0.229) (0.168) (0.117) (0.0853) (0.125) 
Follow the nudge   0.0199 0.369** 0.467***     0.341 0.563*** 0.308**   
    (0.188) (0.182) (0.115)     (0.271) (0.148) (0.118)   
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Observations 44 48 48 48 48 24 24 24 24 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.402 0.333 0.370 0.529 0.222 0.0935 0.0818 0.598 0.328 0.420 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subjects in parentheses. Response dynamics analysis following the procedure by Huck 
et al. (1999). Individual quantity (t) and individual quantity (t-1) describe the absolute number of units produced per firm in 
Round t and t-1, respectively. B, A, EA, PA and PAL denote the treatments Baseline, Authority, Explaining Authority, Private 
Authority and Private Authority Less, respectively. 4 and 2 indicate the number of firms in the market. Each column is estimated 
with data from the relevant treatment only. The regressions of part A and part B were estimated with data of all periods and 
period 13 only, respectively. Significance levels of coefficients: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table A2-4: Regressions on change in individual quantity (𝒒𝒕 − 𝒒𝒕−𝟏), specification 2 
  All periods 
Part A B4 A4 EA4 PA4 PAL4 B2 A2 EA2 PA2 PAL2 
Best response to 
   previous round 
0.404*** 0.0958 0.120** 0.0880 0.401*** 0.330*** 0.0177 -0.0428 0.262*** 0.427*** 
(0.0577) (0.0835) (0.0465) (0.104) (0.0567) (0.0620) (0.0895) (0.0808) (0.0854) (0.0600) 
Follow the nudge   0.417*** 0.291*** 0.392***     0.416*** 0.247*** 0.104   
    (0.0845) (0.0830) (0.0823)     (0.0652) (0.0532) (0.0898)   
Best response to others 
   following the nudge 
  0.153** 0.105*** 0.206***     0.226* 0.220** 0.0215   
  (0.0664) (0.0364) (0.0678)     (0.128) (0.0886) (0.0561)   
Observations 1012 1104 1104 1104 1104 552 552 552 552 552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.244 0.384 0.271 0.395 0.251 0.194 0.342 0.234 0.256 0.256 
                      
  Period 13 only 
Part B B4 A4 EA4 PA4 PAL4 B2 A2 EA2 PA2 PAL2 
Best response to 
   previous round 
0.512* -0.278 0.283*** 0.00569 0.408** 0.234 0.0291 -0.917** -0.256 0.457 
(0.264) (0.196) (0.103) (0.135) (0.186) (0.139) (0.342) (0.368) (0.259) (0.291) 
Follow the nudge   0.467*** 0.350 0.545***     0.339* 0.853*** 0.314***   
    (0.150) (0.219) (0.141)     (0.196) (0.189) (0.0897)   
Best response to others 
   following the nudge 
  0.298** -0.0126 0.0521     -0.00268 0.581** 0.0107   
  (0.116) (0.0603) (0.0554)     (0.335) (0.234) (0.171)   
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Observations 44 48 48 48 48 24 24 24 24 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.333 0.370 0.529 0.212 0.0532 0.0818 0.598 0.328 0.307 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by subjects in parentheses. Response dynamics analysis following the procedure by Huck 
et al. (1999). Individual quantity (t) and individual quantity (t-1) describe the absolute number of units produced per firm in 
Round t and t-1, respectively. B, A, EA, PA and PAL denote the treatments Baseline, Authority, Explaining Authority, Private 
Authority and Private Authority Less, respectively. 4 and 2 indicate the number of firms in the market. Each column is estimated 
with data from the relevant treatment only. The regressions of part A and part B were estimated with data of all periods and 
period 13 only, respectively. Significance levels of coefficients: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
VII – Figure captions 
Figure 1: Average absolute quantities per market and treatment 
Figure A2-1: Absolute number of units produced by period and treatment (4-firms markets 
only) 
Figure A2-2: Absolute number of units produced by period and treatment (2-firms markets 
only) 
Figure A2-3: Histograms of produced quantities, by treatment 
  
   
 
VIII - Figures 
Figure 1 
 
Note: Means plus/minus standard errors (whiskers). The dashed horizontal lines at 79.2 and 
66.0 indicate the Nash prediction for 4 firms and 2 firms settings, respectively. The dash-
dotted horizontal line at 49.5 indicates the collusive production quantity. 
  
   
 
Figure A2-1 
 
Notes: The dotted lines at 79.2 and 49.5 represent the Nash prediction and the collusive 
production quantity, respectively. 
  
   
 
Figure A2-2 
 
Notes: The dotted lines at 66.0 and 49.5 represent the Nash prediction and the collusive 
production quantity, respectively. 
  
   
 
Figure A2-3 
  
Notes: For a better resolution the histograms were cut off at 60. Nevertheless they contain 
99% of all observations. The dashed lines at 12.4 and 24.8 indicate the requested quantities in 
treatments A, EA and PA in 4-firms and 2-firms markets, respectively. The dotted lines at 
19.8 and 33.0 refer to Nash equilibrium quantities in 4-firms and 2-firms markets, 
respectively. The dash-dotted lines at 30.9 and 37.1 denote the one-shot best response to the 
collusive output of all other group members for 4-firms and 2-firms treatments, respectively. 
  
   
 
IX - Appendix 
Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions 
Printed below are instructions for the 4 firms Baseline setting. Parts in [ ] were added to the 
baseline instruction in the A treatment. In the EA treatment, the A treatment instructions were 
extended by parts in [[ ]]. Parts in { } and < > were added to or cut (when struck through) 
from the baseline instructions in the PA and the PAL treatment, respectively. Instructions for 
2 firms treatments were identical with the necessary changes for the different number of 
firms. 
Instructions 
Introduction 
Welcome to today's experiment on decision making. The session will begin shortly. 
Before we start, we have a few reminders. First, to help us keeping the lab neat and tidy, 
we ask you not to eat or drink in the lab. Also, we ask you to turn off your mobile phone 
and other devices completely. Please refrain from talking to other participants during the 
experiment. If you have a question at any point in the experiment, please raise your 
hand. 
In this experiment, you will repeatedly make decisions. By doing this you can earn 
money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other 
participants. 
This experiment consists of 2 stages lasting 12 rounds each. You will receive additional 
instructions on screen before stage 2. <{All participants receive the same instructions.}> 
Your decisions will be absolutely anonymous, i.e. your identity will neither be revealed 
to your co-participants nor to the experimenters at any time during or after the 
experiment. 
Groups of firms 
   
 
In this experiment, you will be matched with three other participants to form a group. 
These groups of four will stay the same throughout the full duration of the experiment.  
You represent a manger in a firm that, like the three other firms in your group, produces 
and sells one and the same product in a market. The costs of production are 1 
experimental currency unit (ECU) per unit of output (this holds for all firms). All firms 
will always have to make one decision, namely, set the quantity they wish to produce. 
Every firm can produce from 0 to 100 units of output in every round. 
Profits 
The following important rule holds: the larger the total quantity of all firms in your 
group, the smaller the price that will emerge in the market. Moreover, the price will be 
zero from a certain amount of total output upwards. Note that the market will always be 
cleared, i.e. whatever price results from the total produced quantity every firm will sell 
all of its quantity. Your profit per unit of output will then be the difference between the 
market price and the unit cost of 1 ECU. Your profit per round is thus equal to the profit 
per unit multiplied by the number of units you sell. Note that you can make a loss, if the 
market price is below the unit costs. 
In each round the outputs of all four firms of your group will be registered, the 
corresponding price will be determined and the respective profits will be computed. 
From the second period on, you will learn about the average output produced by the 
other firms, your own output, the resulting market price and your own profit in the 
previous period, in every period.  
Furthermore, you will have access to a profit calculator. You can use it to simulate your 
profit for arbitrary quantity combinations. You can enter two values, an average quantity 
for the other companies in your group and a quantity for yourself. The profit calculator 
then tells you what your profit would be, given the typed in quantities. You can use the 
profit calculator to simulate as many combinations as you want before each actual 
decision. 
Final Payment 
   
 
This experiment has 2 stages that last 12 rounds each. At the end of the experiment one 
winning round per stage is chosen at random. Whatever your earnings in these two 
rounds were, they are summed up and converted into pounds at the rate of 80 ECU = 1 
pound. If the sum of your stage 1 and stage 2 earnings is negative, this loss will be 
deducted from your participation fee of 3 pounds. 
<{[Request]}> 
<{[You are entirely free to produce as few or as many units of output as you like (from 
0 to 100).]}> 
[That said, we would ask you (and your co-participants) to produce 12.4 units of output. 
We are telling this not just to you but also to your co-participants.] 
[[The reason you should do this is that, if you and your co-participants produce 12.4 
units of output, the total profits of you and your co-participants will be the highest.]] 
[[You can use the profit calculator to check the profitability of producing 12.4 units of 
output per firm.]] 
{That said, we would ask you to produce a specific number of units. This number will 
be displayed on your computer screen soon. When you see the number on the screen, 
please write it down here: _____.} 
<That said, we would ask you (your firm) to produce less than a specific number of 
units of output. This number will be displayed on your computer screen soon. When you 
see the number on the screen, please write it down here: _____.> 
Please remain seated until the experimenter tells you to collect your payment. Before 
starting to take decisions, we ask you to fill in a questionnaire. The only purpose of the 
questionnaire is to check whether you have understood these instructions. 
 
   
 
Appendix 2: Further Analysis 
On market size 
[Insert Figures A2-1 and A2-2 about here] 
[Insert Tables A2-1 and A2-2 about here] 
Response dynamics 
We analyze the response dynamics across treatments following the procedure used by Huck 
et al. (1999); see Table A2-3. By defining three heuristics that subjects might have used to 
respond to the behavior of other group members, we can analyze which heuristic subjects on 
average were more likely to use under which treatment. A subject is described to use a ‘Best 
response’ heuristic if he or she sets quantity such that it maximizes his or her payoff, 
provided that the other subjects in the group produce the same quantity in total as in the 
previous round. Furthermore, a subject is deemed to ‘Imitate the average of the previous 
round’ if he or she produces the average of the other group members’ production in the 
previous round and to ‘Follow the nudge’ if he or she produces exactly the requested 
quantity. 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 is the best response of subject 𝑖 to period 𝑡 − 1, 𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 denotes the imitated 
average of subjects −𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 1 and 𝐹𝑁 is time invariant and denotes the requested 
quantity (in A, EA and PA only). We can then estimate 𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽1(𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1) +
𝛽2(𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐹𝑁 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1). This enables us to identify which of the three heuristics 
can explain the observed behavioral dynamics.30 We present these results in Table A2-3.  
30 The larger a regression coefficient in Table A2-3 is the more explanatory power the 
underlying heuristic has. Note that a regression coefficient for the ‘Follow the nudge’ 
                                                 
   
 
Furthermore, we analyze whether subjects deliberately try to exploit their fellow group 
members by setting their own quantity as the profit maximizing best response to the belief 
that all other group members would follow the nudge.31 We shall understand such subjects as 
using the heuristic ‘Best response to others following the nudge’ (𝐵𝑅𝑁). That quantity is time 
invariant and takes the values of 30.9 and 37.1 for 4-firms and 2-firms markets, respectively. 
Thus we estimate 𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽1(𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑁 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑅𝑁 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡−1) and 
present the results in Table B4.32 
From applying specification 1 to all periods (Table A2-3 – part A), we find that ‘Best 
response to previous round’ across treatments has the highest explanatory power.33 We think 
that ‘Imitating the average’ was also used frequently because, when assuming that other 
subjects on average set their production quantities similar to what they did in the previous 
period, this heuristic would make any firm at least not worse off than others. When focusing 
on period 13 only (period 13 is the first period after subjects were reminded of the nudge), we 
find that the heuristic ‘Follow the nudge’ best explains the data in 5 out of 6 treatments where 
heuristic cannot be estimated for the B and PAL treatments as in neither of them a point 
nudge was provided that they could potentially have followed. 
31 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
32 It is not possible to jointly estimate the explanatory power of all of the above heuristics in 
one specification due to collinearity issues. Huck et al. (1999) also tested for an ‘Imitate the 
best’ heuristic, which subjects could not have used in our experiment as they only received 
information about the other players’ average but not individual production levels. 
33 This is not the case for A2, where ‘Follow the nudge’ explains the observed dynamics best. 
                                                                                                                                                        
   
 
the heuristic could potentially have been applied, i.e. EA4, PA4, A2, EA2 and PA2 (see 
Table A2-3 – part B). 
A comparison of the results obtained from specification 2 over all periods (Table B4 – part 
A) with those from focusing on period 13 only, reveals that subjects indeed ‘Follow the 
nudge’ more often when they were only very recently reminded on their nudge, i.e. the 
production request was very fresh in their minds. When analysing on the regression on all 
periods, there also seems to be some evidence of the use of a ‘Best response to others 
following the nudge’ heuristic, but this seems to be less consistently the case in period 13, 
and Figure A2-3 below does not show much support for the heuristic.  
[Insert Figure A2-3 about here] 
